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LAW AND REGRET 
Eric A. Posner* 
CHANGINGYOURMlND: THELAWOFREGRETTEDDECISIONS. By E. 
Allan Farnsworth. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1998. Pp. xi, 
271. $30. 
Professor Farnsworth's1 topic is what he calls the "law of regretted 
decisions," those laws "that apply when you change your mind and re­
verse a decision" (p. ix). One finds such laws across many doctrinal 
divisions. Contract law influences the decision to change one's mind 
about keeping a promise. Tort law influences the decision to change 
one's mind after starting to rescue another person. The law of wills 
influences the decision to change one's mind about the distribution of 
one's assets among heirs. Farnsworth believes there are general prin­
ciples that underlie the law of regretted decisions. Although there are 
some "anomalies,'' Farnsworth hopes to "further the rationalization of 
legal concepts and the identification and eventual correction of their 
deficiencies" (p. ix). The rationalization of legal concepts appears to 
mean the identification of the common principles that underlie them 
and the revision of the legal concepts that violate those principles. 
What are these principles? Farnsworth identifies six: reliance, in­
tention, dependence, public interest, anti-speculation, and repose. But 
only the first two play an important role in Farnsworth's argument. 
The dependence principle, which appears to refer to cases in which 
conduct (rather than promising) puts others in a vulnerable position, is 
summoned to explain why a person might be liable in tort for begin­
ning but failing to complete a rescue, and why family law holds a step­
father liable for child support after divorce if he has cut off the child's 
relationship with the natural father (pp. 93-96). The public interest 
principle, which is apparently a principle of economizing judicial re­
sources, is ushered in to explain a handful of rules of civil procedure 
that discourage parties from changing their arguments.2 The anti­
speculation principle is hauled out to explain why certain "elections" 
- by the victim of breach, to choose one remedy rather than another, 
* Professor of Law, University of Chicago. B.A., M.A. 1988, Yale; J.D. 1991, Harvard. 
- Ed. Thanks to Richard Craswell and Jack Goldsmith for very helpful comments, and to 
the John M. Olin Fund, the Sarah Scaife Foundation Fund, and the Ameritech Fund in Law 
and Economics, for generous financial support. 
1. E. Allan Farnsworth is Alfred McCormack Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. 
2. Pp. 188-89; see also p. 131 for an application to contract remedies. 
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or to terminate the contract, or by the victim of fraud to avoid the con­
tract - are irreversible (p. 184). If they were not, the victim would in 
effect have a valuable option, but "there is a pronounced judicial dis­
taste for allowing one party to speculate at the other's risk" (p. 184). 
And the repose principle is trotted out to explain why statutes of lirni­
tation bar claims even when there is no reliance on the claim holder's 
inaction (p. 194). These arguments may be reasonable, but they are 
peripheral, and unsurprising as well, so I will not focus on them. 
The reliance principle has the starring role in Farnsworth's book, 
with the intention principle playing a supporting part. The reliance 
principle holds that the law should protect people who (reasonably?) 
rely on the representations or actions of others. The intention princi­
ple holds that the law should protect people's intentions. Farnsworth's 
grand claim appears to be - he is nowhere very specific - that the 
law of regretted decisions can be explained using these two principles 
(when the other four do not intervene). The law does not allow a per­
son to change his mind (and, more important, act on that change of 
mind) when doing so harms someone who has (reasonably?) relied on 
the initial representation or action. When the reliance principle fails 
to explain a law, the intention principle is called upon. The law does 
not let a person change his mind when he did not intend to leave him­
self the opportunity to do so. 
The argument runs into trouble quickly. Farnsworth correctly 
points out that the reliance explanation is circular (p. 40). If the law 
did not enforce promises, people would not rely on them - or at least 
people would not rely on them being legally enforced. So reliance 
cannot be the reason why the law enforces promises. 
To understand this argument, observe initially that frequently the 
law does not enforce promises on which people rely. For example, if 
you break your promise to give me $100 as a gift, courts generally will 
not award me a remedy even if, relying on your gift, I buy a $100 wid­
get on credit. Or, if you break your promise to buy my house, but I 
did not accept by making a return promise to sell my house and then 
rely on your promise by firing my real estate agent, courts will not give 
me a remedy. Or even if I did accept, but we never reduced the con­
tract to writing, courts generally will not give me a remedy even if I 
rely in some way. In all these cases, I rely on your promise, but would 
not receive a remedy. 
Even when the law enforces promises, it does not always provide a 
remedy that compensates a person to the full extent of his reliance. 
Consider a construction contract between an entrepreneur and a con­
tractor that provides that the contractor will complete a new store on a 
certain date. Making no allowance for delay, the entrepreneur orders 
stock to be delivered on the day after the completion date. When the 
contractor fails to finish on time, the entrepreneur claims as damages 
the cost of providing additional transportation and storage for the 
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stock.3 A court will not usually award such damages. Reliance is pro­
tected only when it is reasonable. 
But the theory that the reliance principle protects reasonable reli­
ance, rather than any reliance, is not useful without an account of what 
is reasonable. To understand what reasonable reliance is, one needs a 
separate theory about what counts as reasonable reliance and what 
counts as unreasonable reliance.4 The claim that contract law reflects 
the influence of a reliance principle, without more, does not provide 
such a theory. 
Farnsworth understands all this. Yet he says: 
These objections . . .  ignore the certain outcry from those in the worka­
day world if the value of a promise had to be as deeply discounted as it 
would if the law did not protect the resulting expectations or reliance. 
The circularity argument overlooks the possibility that, regardless of le­
gal consequences, a promise may arouse expectations or induce reliance 
because the promisee supposes that the promisor will be encouraged to 
perform by extralegal restraints. [p. 40] 
The first point confuses the explanation and the thing that is to be 
explained. Everyone agrees that the legal enforcement of promises is 
sensible, but that does not settle the question of why legal enforce­
ment of promises is sensible. That's what one needs a theory for, a 
theory different from the reliance theory. The "workaday world" 
would not object to learn that a theory other than the reliance princi­
ple explains why people can rely on promises; it would not care. 
Farnsworth's second point needs further development to be convinc­
ing. If extralegal restraints are effective, why is it necessary for the law 
to replace them? If they are not effective, why would people rely on 
them? 
The most plausible answer to the question of why promises are en­
forced, is that by enforcing promises, the law enables people to make 
commitments that they would otherwise not be able to make, and 
these commitments allow people to obtain good things in return (cash, 
services, goods). If I cannot legally commit myself to repay loans with 
interest, banks will not lend me money to buy a house. One does not 
need to be a thoroughgoing Benthamite to recognize the value of laws 
and institutions that enable people to accomplish goals that are impor­
tant to them and enhance their well-being. Indeed, Farnsworth, who 
3. See Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution, 
73 CAL. L. REV. l, 11-12 {1985). 
4. A discussion of this argument can be found in Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory 
of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 275 {1986). Farnsworth's argument is, as he acknowl­
edges, derivative of Fuller and Perdue's argument. See generally Lon L. Fuller & William R. 
Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: I, 46 YALE L.J. 52 {1936), and the 
literature that it has spawned. As Richard Craswell shows in a recent article, the influence 
of Fuller and Perdue's article has been unfortunate. See generally Richard Craswell, Against 
Fuller and Perdue, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 99 {2000). 
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does not seem to be a thoroughgoing Benthamite, agrees with this 
welfarist explanation for the enforceability of promises (see Ch. 1 and 
pp. 38, 42). But he does not attempt to reconcile the welfarist view 
and the reliance view that he adopts; indeed, he does not even say 
what he thinks is the relationship between these two explanations. 
The circularity problem dissolves as soon as one sees that the 
promisor and promisee have a joint interest in taking actions that 
maximize the expected value of their contractual relationship. This 
will usually involve (a) the promisor keeping his promise or paying 
damages, and (b) the promisee engaging in an efficient amount of "re­
liance," or investment in anticipation of the promisor's performance. 
Reasonable reliance is then understood as the amount of reliance that 
maximizes the value of the promise. The law can encourage reason­
able reliance by awarding damages upon breach of contract equal to 
what the promisee would have gained if the promise had been per­
formed and he had engaged in reasonable reliance, whether or not in 
fact he did.5 
Farnsworth might agree or disagree with this argument. If he dis­
agrees with it, he should explain why, as it avojds the circularity prob­
lem and it has long been a part of the contracts literature. Instead, 
Farnsworth moves on, and uses his reliance theory, despite its ac­
knowledged defects, to explain various doctrines of contract law. 
In Chapter Five, Farnsworth puzzles over the question of why 
unrelied-upon promises are enforced, which seems to contradict the 
reliance principle. He concludes that unrelied-upon promises are en­
forced because. reliance (especially reliance consisting of the forgoing 
of other opportunities) is difficult to prove (pp. 57-59). This response 
is not so much wrong as it is unhelpful. Promises that take place 
within markets are, in a sense, always relied upon. When a buyer 
commits to buying from a seller, he detrimentally relies by giving up 
the opportunity to buy from another seller. Promises that occur out­
side markets are not always relied upon, though they may be. The 
beneficiary of a gratuitous promise may rely on a promise by shifting 
his position, but he also may not. When he does, and when doing so 
increases the value of the promise, there is an argument for enforcing 
the promise. When he does not, the argument for enforcing the 
promise is weaker.6 Difficulty of proof is always a consideration for 
courts, and it is reflected in the use of presumptions, burden-shifting, 
and other devices of civil procedure. But something more is needed to 
explain patterns of contract doctrine. 
5. See Jim Leitzel, Reliance and Contract Breach, 52 LA w 8i. CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 
1989, at 87, 91. 
6. See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the 
Basis of Contract, 89 YALE LJ. 1261 (1980); Steven Shavell, An Economic Analysis of Al­
truism and Deferred Gifts, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 401 (1991). 
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A similar point emerges from Farnsworth's discussion of why 
courts award expectation damages given that (in his view) the reliance 
principle explains contract enforcement. He argues that the expecta­
tion measure of damages is justified, because reliance includes lost op­
portunities, and "since lost opportunities are hard to prove, expecta­
tion is a surrogate measure for reliance."7 Again, lost opportunities 
are not always hard to prove, and the difficulty of proof is dealt with 
more easily by giving the promisee a presumption that reliance has oc­
curred. If the reliance principle is so important, why not give the 
promisor the chance to rebut the presumption by offering proof that 
the promisee did not incur opportunity costs? 
Farnsworth next argues that the expectation measure "produces 
the apparently satisfying result of forcing the promisor to take into ac­
count the contract's value to the promisee when calculating the effects 
of breach, thereby enhancing the promisor's incentives to perform and 
encouraging people to deal with promisors" (p. 115). This is a refer­
ence to the so-called "efficient breach" theory. Farnsworth does not 
explain why, if he thinks that reliance is the explanation for contract 
enforcement, here he adopts an economic or welfarist view. Further, 
he does not explain why we want to: (1) enhance the promisor's in­
centive to perform (and if so, why not award damages higher than ex­
pectation damages?); (2) encourage people to deal with promisors 
(even when doing so is unwise?); and (3) ignore other incentives for 
which the expectation measure is ill-suited, such as the promisee's in­
centive to take care.8 
In the second half of his book, Farnsworth turns from commit­
ments (or promises) to what he calls relinquishments and preclusions. 
Relinquishments and preclusions occur when a person surrenders 
something that he has to someone else (pp. 120-22). I will ignore the 
small distinction that Farnsworth makes between them, and focus on 
what happens when a person makes a transfer - either as a gift, or as 
part of an exchange - and then changes his mind and seeks to reverse 
this transfer. 
Farnsworth asks the interesting question why the law treats trans­
fers and promises differently. If I promise to give someone my car as a 
gift, I generally can change my mind, retract the promise, and keep the 
car without paying a penalty. But if I actually transfer title to the do-
7. P. 115. These claims are staples in the literature, as Farnsworth acknowledges. They 
derive from Fuller and Perdue, see supra note 4, at 60, and are periodically resurrected, see 
e.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95 HARV. L. REV. 741, 
788-89 (1982). 
8. Put more bluntly, Farnsworth wants to use the insights of law and economics, but he 
does not take the trouble to provide an adequate account of the complexities that the litera­
ture has identified. For a recent survey, see Steven Shaven, Contracts, in THE NEW 
PALGRA VE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 436, 436-45 (Peter Newman ed., 
1998). 
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nee, I can't change my mind and get the car back. A similar, though 
less stark, difference applies in the commercial context. If I breach my 
promise to sell my car to you for $5000, I have to pay you damages. If, 
however, I sell my car to you for $5000, and deliver it to you, I cannot 
get the car back from you by forcing you to accept payment of the 
damages that you would receive for breach of contract. Instead, 
I must obtain your consent. In other words (although not in 
Farnsworth's ), both nongratuitous and gratuitous transferees are pro­
tected by a property rule; nongratuitous promisees are protected by a 
liability rule; and gratuitous promisees are not protected at all (or, if 
you want, the gratuitous promisor's interest in the promised goods is 
protected by a property rule).9 
This pattern is interesting, as other legal scholars have recog­
nized, 10 but what are we to make of it? Farnsworth argues that the 
"intention principle" explains why transfers are not generally reversi­
ble. This will surprise the reader. If Farnsworth believes that the reli­
ance principle, and not the intention principle, explains why promises 
are enforced, why does he then appeal to the intention principle in or­
der to explain why transfers are enforced? As Farnsworth's argument 
is difficult to follow, I will take it step by step. 
Farnsworth first observes that what counts as performance is de­
fined by the parties' intent. In the case of the sale, the parties intend 
that ownership pass from seller to buyer. By contrast, in the case of a 
lease or bailment, the parties intend that the transferee will keep the 
goods only for a certain period of time (pp. 129-31). It is unclear, 
however, what Farnsworth makes of these examples. He appears to 
think that they illustrate the relevance of the parties' intentions. But 
in both cases, a certain right is passed from one person to another -
the right to keep the goods for all time, or the right to keep the goods 
for a certain period of time - and in neither case can the transferor 
change his mind and take the goods back (at all in the first case and 
during the time period, in the second case). Intention explains the 
right, but it does not explain the remedy, which is the subject of 
Farnsworth's concern. 
To see why this first step is not helpful, observe that Farnsworth 
could have said the same thing about a promise. When a person 
promises to make a sale, he promises to transfer title. When he 
promises to lease an item, he promises to transfer possession for a cer­
tain period of time. So intentions control the nature of the property 
right that will move from one person to another, but they do not ex­
plain why a liability rule protects the promisee but a property rule pro-
9. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedra� 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089 (1972). 
10. See generally Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Donative Promises, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 
(1979); Andrew Kull, Reconsidering Gratuitous Promises, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 39 (1992). 
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tects the transferee. Indeed, when discussing promises, Farnsworth 
thinks that the reliance principle, not the intention principle, explains 
the remedy. 
Farnsworth's next point is that parties can contractually arrange 
for the seller to retain an interest in the goods after delivery, so that if 
the buyer fails to come up with the money, the seller can recover the 
goods rather than, or in addition to, damages (p. 130). In other words, 
parties can contractually provide for remedies in certain cases, as well 
as rights. Farnsworth adds for good measure that a seller may be able 
to obtain possession-of the goods, even if he does not provide for such 
a remedy in the contract, if he was unduly influenced by the buyer (pp. 
130-31). Farnsworth thus concludes, with some additional complica­
tions that need not occupy us here, that the intention principle ex­
plains why sellers cannot repossess goods after delivery if the buyer 
breaches. 
It is not clear why Farnsworth thinks that these observations sup­
port his claim that the use of property rules to protect the transferee is 
based on the inte�tion principle. The law gives parties a great deal of 
freedom to craft property interests, but it also gives parties freedom to 
craft remedies in case of breach of contract. Yet Farnsworth believes 
that remedies for breach of contract are based on the reliance princi­
ple. His mistake is in thinking that the law's respect for free choice 
explains anything. The problem he seeks to solve is the law's treat­
ment of regretted decisions exactly in those instances where the par­
ties do not provide an answer by contract. When the parties do not 
stipulate that the promisor can change his mind, and either not per­
form a promise or take back some item, the law must supply some de­
fault. We need a theory to explain why the law chooses particular de­
faults; the fact that the law allows people to depart from the defaults is 
not relevant. 
It should be clear by now where Farnsworth goes wrong. He con­
fuses the question of who should get the entitlement with the question 
of what is the proper remedy. If the intention principle and the reli­
ance principle mean anything (and one should have doubts about 
whether they do), they mean that a promisee should have the entitle­
ment, and that the transferee should have the entitlement. That is 
what both parties intend, and that is how both parties rely. But these 
principles cannot answer the further question of whether the relevant 
entitlement should be protected by a property rule or a liability rule 
when the parties do not express an intention. When the parties do not 
express an intention, either rule is consistent with their intentions and 
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either rule can protect, in the loose sense used by Farnsworth, the en­
titlement holder's reliance.11 
Farnsworth fares no better when he again invokes the intention 
principle to explain the law's treatment of gratuitous transfers. He 
makes two arguments. First, he argues that "a gift speaks to the pres­
ent," whereas a promise speaks to the future, so "there is less reason 
for a legal system given to paternalism to protect [the donor] from his 
own improvidence" (p. 134). The implication is that some intentions 
matter more than others, but how can we evaluate intentions without 
having some theory that explains which intentions are pure and which 
are corrupt? The reference to paternalism is not helpful. The law al­
lows me to promise someone $100,000 in return for some internet 
stocks that might have no value tomorrow; why would it not allow me 
to promise to give away that much money? 
Second, Farnsworth argues that "a gift is limited to what one has," 
so one is "powerless to squander [one's] future by means of a gift" (p. 
134). Again, having invoked the intention principle to explain why 
transfers are enforceable even though gratuitous promises are not, 
Farnsworth bases his explanation on paternalism. The intention prin­
ciple can make no sense of the different treatment of gratuitous 
promises and gratuitous transfers. Both are intended, yet only gratui­
tous transfers are enforceable. 
What, then, explains the patterns of law that we have been dis­
cussing? There is not space here to provide a complete theory, but a 
few observations are in order. First, note that transferees receive 
stronger protection than promisees. So the theory must show that a 
person who possesses a good can more effectively invest in it than can 
a person who merely expects to receive the good in the future. This is 
plausible because a possessor is likely to have more information about 
a good than a person who does not yet possess it. The good is in the 
possessor's hands; he knows best how to store, maintain, and use it. 
So even if the person who no longer has the entitlement - whether 
transferor or promisor - does turn out to value the good more, the 
transferor should not be able to violate the transferee's rights as freely 
as the promisor should be able to violate the promisee's rights. The 
location of possession distinguishes the two cases. 
Second, note that recipients of gifts (including promises) receive 
less protection than people who receive transfers or promises pursuant 
to an ordinary exchange contract.12 This observation suggests that we 
need a theory for why gifts are treated differently from commercial 
11. Cf. Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising, 
88 MICH. L. REV. 489 (1989) (arguing that available philosophical theories about promises 
provide no basis for choosing among default rules). 
12. See Eric A. Posner, Altruism, Status, and Trust in the Law of Gifts and Gratuitous 
Promises, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 567, 592-95 (1997). 
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exchanges. Perhaps the social value of gifts is more ambiguous than 
the social value of exchange - an old theme, about which there are 
interesting arguments on both sides.13 Whatever the case, only such a 
theory, not an appeal to principles of intention or reliance, can explain 
the law's different treatment of gifts and exchanges. Intentions cannot 
explain the law because the law regularly violates people's intentions 
to give gifts. Reliance cannot explain the law because people's reli­
ance depends on what the law is. 
*** 
Farnsworth's book is framed by a quotation from Rousseau - "it 
is absurd that the will should put itself in chains for the future" (p. 70) 
- that does not mean what Farnsworth says it means. Farnsworth in­
terprets this statement to mean that an individual would never ration­
ally commit himself to performing some action. But Rousseau means 
nothing of the sort. The passage from which Farnsworth appears to 
have taken the quotation concerns the nature of the sovereign (the 
"general will"), not the interests of an individual's will.14 It is clear 
from other passages in the book that Rousseau sees the obvious ad­
vantages that accrue to individuals when they make binding commit­
ments.15 
This does not detract from Farnsworth's substantive claims, but it 
is symptomatic of the problem with his book. Farnsworth is a thor­
ough and sophisticated scholar of contract doctrine - this is evident 
from his superb treatise - but he does not fully take advantage of the 
disciplines that might be used to understand that doctrine. Philosophy 
and literature are mined for quotations but not for ideas. Economic 
concepts are introduced but not explained or integrated with the ar­
gument.16 Insights from sociology and psychology are ignored. 
Farnsworth seems to think that doctrine itself can supply the princi­
ples that will explain it, but it cannot. The doctrine itself has inconsis­
tencies, so narrow principles are falsified and principles broad enough 
to encompass the contradictions have no critical edge. 
Farnsworth's intermittent discussion of the case of Enricho 
Navarroli illustrates these problems.17 The state of Illinois had 
charged Navarroli with drug dealing. The prosecutor promised 
Navarroli that if he cooperated in the investigation, the prosecutor 
13. See id. at 585-92. 
14. See JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 69-70 {Maurice Cranston 
trans., 1968). 
15. See id. at 60-61. 
16. See supra note 8. 
17. See People v. Navarroli, 521 N.E.2d 891 {Ill. 1988). 
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would reduce the charges. Navarroli did cooperate, but the prosecu­
tor broke his promise. When Navarroli objected, claiming breach of 
contract, the trial court held in his favor, but the Supreme Court of 
Illinois reversed the decision and held for the state. The court held 
that Navarroli was not denied any of his constitutional rights because 
he did not plead guilty in reliance on the prosecutor's promise. 
Navarroli relied by cooperating in the identification of other criminals, 
not by giving up constitutional rights. Farnsworth's criticism of the 
court's holding can be quoted in full: 
But even if [Navarroli] had no constitutional right, the reliance principle 
surely justified the relief granted by the trial court. In finding it, with 
Rousseau, "absurd that the will should put itself in chains for the future," 
and in allowing the state to change its mind to what Papinian would have 
called Enricho's "disadvantage," the Supreme Court of Illinois disre­
garded this widely recognized general principle of contract law. [p. 203] 
This argument is unconvincing. Navarroli relied on the prosecu­
tor's promise, but we have seen that reliance is not always sufficient to 
justify relief. Suppose that a detective told Navarroli soon after pick­
ing him up (and after Navarroli waived his constitutional rights) that 
he would release Navarroli if Navarroli identified another suspect. 
Navarroli, relying on this promise, identifies another suspect, but the 
detective breaks his promise to release Navarroli. This kind of deceit 
is common, and courts do not provide criminals with a remedy when 
detectives engage in it. The suspect relies, but the reliance has no 
normative import in the theories that we use to justify the criminal jus­
tice system. 
It should be clear that sometimes reliance matters while other 
times it does not matter. How do we decide whether reliance should 
matter? If we think the police should not break promises made to 
suspects in custody, then we should punish the detective in my hypo­
thetical. If we think prosecutors should not break promises made to 
criminal defendants, then we may object to the state's action in the 
Navarroli case. But we need a theory for why we should think this. 
That theory might balance a sense of fair play or respect for the 
autonomy of citizens, on the one hand, and the exigencies of criminal 
law enforcement, on the other hand, and where that balancing takes us 
is by no means obvious. We might think that detectives should be able 
to break promises but that prosecutors should not. The point, though, 
is that we cannot resolve this question by appealing to the principle of 
reliance. 
One theory is that the prosecutor should take whatever actions 
maximize the likelihood of successful criminal prosecutions, consistent 
with constitutional protections. A defender of Navarroli could point 
out that prosecutors will not be able to extract information from 
criminal defendants if prosecutors cannot make enforceable promises 
in return. If courts do not enforce agreements between prosecutors 
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and defendants, prosecutors will lose a valuable weapon for fighting 
crirne.18 
But there is a contrary argument. Prosecutors know that if they 
violate agreements, defendants will not enter them; therefore, prose­
cutors have every incentive not to violate such agreements, at least if 
they think that defendants learn about prior violations. Prosecutors 
violate agreements only when the benefits (such as the capture of a 
particularly vicious criminal) exceed the harm to the prospects of fu­
ture cooperation with other defendants. Prosecutors are in the best 
position to make this tradeoff, not courts; so courts should not enforce 
agreements that prosecutors violate. True, rogue prosecutors might 
violate some agreements in order to obtain short-term political gains, 
and the institution would be better off if courts restrained such be­
havior. But courts are not well-suited for regulating the internal gov­
ernance of prosecutor's offices, and supervision is perhaps best left to 
higher political officials. 
Much more can be said about these interesting issues. There are 
philosophical questions about the proper treatment of regret; socio­
logical questions about the internal organization of prosecutor's of­
fices and the extent to which prosecutorial policy filters down to the 
street; political and institutional questions about the relationship be­
tween courts and prosecutors; economic questions about the optimal 
design of plea agreements; psychological questions about the ability of 
criminal defendants to understand plea agreements and to make vol­
untary decisions in difficult circumstances. But these questions are in­
visible in the methodology on which Farnsworth relies. One cannot 
answer hard questions about the design of criminal justice institutions 
by appealing to abstract notions of reliance, notions that themselves 
are wrenched from contexts as different as gift-giving among family 
members and commercial exchange. 
*** 
What leads Farnsworth down this path? Farnsworth sees himself 
as describing the principles of contract law, and he appears to think of 
principles in the following way. At the highest level, there are norma­
tive goals and ideals, including enhancement of well-being and per­
haps various deontol9gical constraints. At the lowest level, there are 
the cases and doctrines themselves, like the consideration doctrine. In 
between are the principles. These are generalizations about the doc­
trines and cases, but they are justified only to the extent that they 
18. This argument was made by tbe dissent. The dissenting judge did not simply appeal 
to the reliance principle; he argued that the majority's view would discourage plea agree­
ments. See Navarroli, 521 N.E.2d at 897-900 (Clark, J., dissenting). 
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make sense in light of our normative ideals. The principles are inter­
mediate between the normative ideals and the cases themselves. 
The intermediary role of principles creates tensions, and this can 
be seen at both the positive and normative levels at which the book 
operates. Consider first the positive arguments. Farnsworth claims 
that contract law obeys the reliance and intention principles, as well as 
other principles. But he notes the many ways in which these principles 
fail to explain certain doctrines. Farnsworth acknowledges that the 
reliance principle cannot explain why gratuitous promises to charities 
are enforceable. He accordingly appeals to the intention principle 
here (pp. 78-79). But if the intention principle holds, why don't courts 
enforce gratuitous promises made to non-charities? The answer ap­
pears to be, in Farnsworth's mind, that charitable gifts are socially 
valuable and other sorts of gifts might be impulsive. But then the real 
positive explanation of the cases is some combination of social values 
- the desire to promote charitable giving, the desire to protect people 
from their impulsiveness - and the intention principle plays no role. 
Farnsworth could have skipped a step by arguing that courts do not 
enforce gratuitous promises because they think that these promises of­
ten are made impulsively, unless the beneficiaries are charities, be­
cause the courts think that charities should be promoted. If this is the 
explanation for the doctrine, it is unnecessary to appeal to intermedi­
ate principles like the intention and reliance principles. 
A similar point can be made about Farnsworth's normative argu­
ments. For example, he regrets that gratuitous promises that meet 
some formality are not enforceable. If the enforcement of such 
promises is desirable, but violates the reliance principle, then the mere 
fact that the reliance principle can be derived from contract cases (if it 
can) does not give it normative force. But if the reliance principle 
does not have normative force, we cannot use it to praise or condemn 
particular contract cases or doctrines. Yet Farnsworth does exactly 
that when he criticizes the Navarroli court for violating the reliance 
principle when refusing to enforce the plea agreement. 
The problem with Farnsworth's methodology is that the content of 
the principles depends on their justification. As noted before, no sen­
sible intermediate principle would hold that all reliance should be pro­
tected. Rather, only reasonable reliance should be protected, but one 
needs a theory to explain what reasonable reliance is. · Similarly, no 
sensible intermediate principle would say that all intentions should be 
protected, and one needs a theory to distinguish intentions that should 
be protected from those that should not be protected. The intermedi­
ate principles, then, do not have a critical edge unless one refers con­
stantly to more general normative ideals, and that is what Farnsworth 
-does. The result is that the intermediate principles disappear as 
sources of explanatory power, from both a normative and a positive 
perspective. 
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The intermediate principles could be understood in another way: 
as descriptions of general patterns that appear in the doctrine. Vari­
ous doctrines that might otherwise seem unrelated display interesting 
consistencies. The consistencies can be described as principles; the 
principles have no explanatory value, but need to be explained. To 
explain them, we rely on economic, philosophical, or some other high­
level analysis. 
There is nothing wrong with this style of scholarship as an a priori 
matter, and it has a long and distinguished tradition. The problem is 
that typically the search for principles takes over and becomes an end 
in itself. All effort goes toward showing that cases are consistent (or 
not) with each other, and the higher-level analysis comes through the 
back door, usually to explain the occasional deviations, so the princi­
ples themselves, and most of the law, are left unexplained. This hap­
pens repeatedly in Farnsworth's book. A deviation from the intention 
principle is described as "paternalism," but paternalism is a complex 
idea, and raises more questions than it answers. What kind of pater­
nalism? Is it justified? And so on. Farnsworth argues that people are, 
or should be, released from certain commitments when the attractive­
ness of the commitment is the result of cognitive biases. But what are 
these cognitive biases? Surely they do not justify releasing a person 
from every commitment; but if not from every commitment, which 
ones? Farnsworth says that expectation damages allow efficient 
breach. But is breach always efficient? When is it efficient, and when 
is it not? 
Many scholars have abandoned the doctrinal approach taken by 
Farnsworth because that approach takes for granted all of the difficult 
questions. How would they write a book about the "law of regretted 
decisions"? One can only speculate, but let me say a few words. 
To the economist, regret is not a special or interesting concept. 
When people make promises, or induce reliance through their con­
duct, it will sometimes be the case that the joint value of the promisor 
and promisee's investment will be maximized if the promisor can 
avoid keeping his promise, perhaps paying damages or perhaps not. 
Optimal contract law will enforce promises to the extent that maxi­
mizes value. Whether or not the promisor regrets his promise is im­
material. 
To the psychologist, regret is special. Some psychologists believe 
that a person's fear of feeling regret will cause him to engage in be­
havior that is irrational under standard economic assumptions. 
Whether it follows that the law or the courts have a role in regulating 
this behavior is a difficult question. But the research project is clear: 
to show ways in which the law recognizes this cognitive bias.19 
19. See Chris Guthrie, Better Settle Than Sorry: The Regret Aversion Theory of Litiga­
tion Behavior, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 43, 62-73 (1999). 
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To the philosopher, regret is also special. It raises the question of 
why the "future self," the person who is bound to keep a promise, 
should suffer as a consequence of the behavior of the "present self," 
the person who makes the promise.20 In some ways, the future self is a 
different moral entity, so the benefit that the ability to make commit­
ments confers on the present self does not necessarily justify the harm 
to the future self - any more than the benefit that a government proj­
ect confers on me justifies the harm that it imposes on you. 
Farnsworth acknowledges this research but does not use it. That is 
too bad. The research is often legally unsophisticated, simplifying the 
law so much that it is almost unrecognizable. A synthetic approach to 
the research by a legally sophisticated scholar like Farnsworth might 
have produced a more distinctive contribution to contracts scholar­
ship. 
20. See DEREK p ARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS (1984). 
